INTRO
"Imagine you wake up, check your emails… and your account is gone. No warning, no password reset request, just… gone. Someone silently swapped your email, and now they own everything.
Or maybe it’s worse. Maybe an attacker doesn’t just steal an account… they take over an entire system. Full admin access. No passwords needed. One flaw. Total control.
But what if an attacker didn’t need credentials at all? Didn’t need WiFi. Didn’t even need internet access. What if they could control a device… just by standing nearby?
These aren’t just vulnerabilities. They’re the kind of flaws pentesters and developers must find before attackers do. Because if we don’t catch them first… someone else will.
Today, we’re diving into three real-world exploits that prove one thing—authentication alone isn’t enough."
FINDING #1 - How a Security Researcher Took Over an Entire Shopping Platform with Just One Request
"Imagine you wake up, check your emails, and see a notification.
Someone just took over your online store.
You didn’t reset your password. You didn’t click any suspicious links. But somehow… they now control everything.
No warnings. No alerts. No chance to stop it.
Now, think about this—if you were an attacker, what’s the easiest way to take over an account? Password reset abuse? Social engineering? This attack was even simpler. And the scariest part? They didn’t hack your account. They just swapped your email address… and the system let them.
That’s exactly what imgnotfound reported on HackerOne—a critical security flaw in a shopping platform’s account management system that allowed an attacker to take over an account without even confirming the email change.
No phishing. No brute force. Just pure exploitation of a broken account linking process.
Here’s how it happened:
Everything looked normal at first. The platform had a staff management system where users could log in, manage stores, and perform actions. If an employee needed to update their email, the system was supposed to verify ownership—usually by sending a confirmation link to the original email—before making any changes. But there was one major flaw: the system didn’t require confirmation from the original email before linking accounts.
With the right approach, an attacker could silently replace the email on any account, locking the real owner out without them even knowing. This wasn’t about exploiting a bug—it was about exploiting logic. The system wasn’t broken… it was designed this way.
The attacker started by creating a fake development store using the partner dashboard—a normal feature for creating test stores. During the store creation process, they noticed something strange: the email field was read-only and wasn’t supposed to be changed. Instead of accepting that, they intercepted the request using Burp Suite and modified the email field before it was sent to the server. They changed it to an email address they controlled, sent the request—and the system accepted it with no verification.
The system then sent them a verification email, which they clicked to fully verify their account.
At this point, they weren’t inside anyone else’s account yet. But this had unlocked the second part of the attack. Now that they had a verified account, they added Point of Sale (POS) as a sales channel, which gave them access to the Staff Management system.
Inside the staff settings, they found a page to update their own staff profile. Then, they found a hidden email field. They intercepted the request, replaced their own email with the victim’s email, and sent the modified request. They refreshed the page—and just like that, the system prompted them to create a new account for the victim’s store.
No password reset. No email confirmation. No way for the real owner to stop it.
And the worst part? The victim had no idea it even happened.
At this point, the attacker had full control over the victim’s store. But there was one last step to make the takeover permanent. They went into the newly linked account settings, changed the email back to one they controlled, and now even if the victim tried to reset their password, they were completely locked out.
No recovery. No warning. Just gone.
Let’s take a step back: The attacker never guessed a password, never triggered a security alert, never interacted with the victim. They simply changed an email—and the system handed them the account. Imagine running an online store with orders coming in, customer data stored, and transactions happening in real time. Then, in an instant… your entire business is gone. Not hacked, not suspended—just transferred to someone else.
This wasn’t just an account takeover—this was a business killer.
For developers, here’s what should have been done:
• Require email confirmation for account changes and validate ownership on the server side. Any email update should trigger a verification link to the original email, preventing unauthorized changes.
• Enforce server-side restrictions on input fields. A read-only field in the UI means nothing if an attacker can modify it in the request; lock it down at the backend.
For pentesters, here’s how you could have found this issue:
• Always test account linking flows and look for hidden input fields in API requests.
• Analyze multi-step authentication logic. If email verification is enforced during signup but missing during account updates, that’s a prime attack vector.
This ingenious attack by imgnotfound proves that sometimes the best exploits require zero malware and zero phishing—just pure logical abuse."
FINDING #2 - How a Security Researcher Hacked an Entire Internal Network with Just One URL
"Taking over an account by swapping an email? That’s bad, as we already discussed in Finding 1. But what if I told you the next attack doesn’t just bypass authentication—it hands over full admin control of an entire system. No phishing. No brute force. Just one mistake that gave an attacker everything.
Imagine you’re testing an internal monitoring system. Everything looks locked down. No leaked credentials. No obvious vulnerabilities. But then, you find something strange: a hidden access key buried in documentation, a special login URL that seems different from the standard one—and suddenly, you start to suspect something is off.
This wasn’t just a standard login system. There was an alternative way in. That’s exactly what PyaePhyoThu98 uncovered and reported on OpenBugBounty when they found a critical authentication bypass in a widely used Java-based monitoring system.
At first, everything looked secure. This system was designed to monitor networks, track server performance, and manage IT infrastructure. It had a login portal, password authentication, and session management—only authorized administrators were supposed to access it.
The researcher started digging into official documentation and found something odd—a reference to an access key. Not just any access key—a predefined one. It wasn’t immediately clear where this key was used or if it was still valid, but it was worth investigating. They started searching through documentation to understand how the key worked. And then, they found something even worse:
The system had a dedicated admin login URL that completely bypassed the standard authentication page. It wasn’t as simple as copying and pasting the access key into a login field; it required understanding how the system expected authentication requests.
They analyzed how authentication worked, what parameters were being passed, and what the server expected. Then, they modified the admin login URL by injecting the access key into the request. Some attempts failed; some returned errors. But then, one attempt worked. And just like that, they were inside—no password reset, no security prompt. The system accepted the access key and automatically authenticated them as an admin.
But if that wasn’t bad enough, inside the admin panel they found a built-in remote command execution tool—a feature that allowed administrators to run commands directly on the internal network. With admin access, they ran a test with the 'whoami' command. The result? Full system-level access.
This had gone from a login bypass to full control over the company’s servers. At this point, they could do anything: deploy malware, exfiltrate data, shut down systems, even pivot deeper into the network. And here’s the terrifying part: this wasn’t an isolated system. This software was used by multiple companies, meaning any business using this tool could be vulnerable to full infrastructure takeover.
Now, imagine you’re a company running this system. You assume your network monitoring tool is safe—only admins can log in, right? Except… anyone with a slightly modified login URL and a hardcoded access key could walk right in.
Once inside, they don’t need to guess a password, they can execute commands on your network, and pivot deeper into your systems.
Could this attack still work today? If companies enforce proper session validation and access key security, perhaps not. But in real-world pentesting, legacy authentication mechanisms relying on hardcoded access keys, API tokens, or undocumented login flows still exist.
This is why pentesters must check every possible authentication method.
Here’s the attacker’s mindset: first, they searched for alternative login mechanisms—an opportunity. Next, they identified an undocumented access key—a weakness. Finally, they crafted a request to inject the key into the admin URL—exploitation.
For developers:
• Never use predefined access keys for authentication.
• Enforce strong session management. If a user skips the login page, deny their session.
• Disable hardcoded credentials in documentation; authentication should never rely on static access keys.
For pentesters:
• Always check for alternative authentication flows. Test all login mechanisms.
• Look for hardcoded access keys in documentation, environment variables, or configuration files.
This finding shows that sometimes the simplest authentication flaws can lead to full system compromise."
FINDING #3 - How a Security Researcher Took Over a Smart Switch Using Just Bluetooth
"So far, we’ve seen two attacks—one that stole an account and one that took over a system. But what if an attacker didn’t need credentials? Didn’t need WiFi? Didn’t even need internet access? What if they could control a device just by standing nearby?
Imagine you install a smart switch in your home. It’s compact, modern, and fully automated. You can control it remotely, monitor power usage, even set automation scripts to trigger actions. You assume it’s secure because it requires authentication—a username, a password, and hashed tokens. But what if I told you I just turned your lights on and off without you noticing?
No login. No credentials. Just a Bluetooth request that shouldn’t have been possible.
That’s exactly what Victor Hanna, Director of Exploit Security, discovered when he uncovered a critical authentication bypass in a four-channel smart switch. This ingenious attack was contributed by Victor as part of our community contribution program.
Now, think about it—if you were testing a smart device, what’s the most unexpected way to bypass authentication? Would you try brute-forcing the login? Intercept API requests and manipulate parameters? Or would you dig deeper for a hidden entry point that no one ever notices, just like Victor did?
Here’s how he uncovered it:
At first, everything looked secure. The smart switch was built for both home automation and industrial control, offering multiple ways to connect—WiFi, Ethernet, and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), a lightweight wireless protocol for low-power devices.
Most users controlled the switch through a mobile app that sent secure HTTP requests using a challenge-response authentication system, where every login attempt required a fresh, hashed token. Victor started by probing the HTTP authentication—testing for replay attacks, brute force, and weak hashing algorithms—but nothing worked. The developers had locked it down well; every request was properly validated, every token was unique.
Then, Victor turned his attention to Bluetooth. Unlike the HTTP authentication system, BLE commands didn’t seem to have the same protections. He analyzed the device’s BLE stack—the internal software responsible for handling Bluetooth communications—and noticed something strange. The device had a designated memory location for processing incoming Bluetooth commands, but it wasn’t properly protected. This meant that sending a command larger than expected would crash the device. And when the device rebooted, it executed the last stored automation script.
Now, here’s where things get interesting. The smart switch had a scripting feature that enabled users to create custom automation rules, such as:
• Automatically cutting power if energy consumption exceeds a set threshold.
• Triggering a security alarm when an unauthorized button press is detected.
• Turning lights on and off at specific times to simulate occupancy.
Attackers couldn’t create their own automation scripts—that required authentication. But here’s the critical flaw: if a user had already set up an automation rule, attackers could trigger it without authentication simply by crashing the system. This meant that if the device had a pre-configured automation rule, attackers could force it to execute at will.
If the device was connected to industrial equipment, they could manipulate operations remotely. If relays controlled physical systems, they could trigger them remotely. And if attackers were within physical range, they could hijack the system without ever touching the WiFi or Ethernet network. If no automation scripts were configured, the only effect would be a forced reboot.
Now, imagine this in a real-world scenario. You install a smart switch in your office, factory, or home. It’s secured behind a login and connected to your private WiFi network. But an attacker standing outside—on the street, in a parking lot, even next door—could send a crafted Bluetooth request, forcing the device to reboot and execute commands. They never needed your WiFi password, your admin credentials, or even the app. And it didn’t matter if authentication was enabled or not—the device still executed the commands.
For developers, here’s what should have been done:
• Harden the BLE stack against memory corruption. Attackers should never be able to crash a system using malformed input.
• Ensure Bluetooth commands are properly authenticated. No action should execute without verifying the user.
• Disable scripting features by default. If automation is necessary, require explicit authentication before execution.
For pentesters, here’s how you could have found this issue:
• Always test multiple communication methods. If HTTP authentication is strong, check BLE, MQTT, Zigbee, WebSockets, or other interfaces.
• Investigate memory handling and reboot behavior. Many IoT devices fail to validate memory operations properly, leading to crashes and potential exploits.
• Test for chained attacks. A single flaw might seem small, but when combined with another feature—like automation scripting—it can become a serious security risk.
Victor and the team at Exploit Security, thank you for submitting this finding. And thank you to everyone else who has shared their discoveries through our Google Form—we see you, and we appreciate you."
OUTRO
"Every vulnerability we talked about today—every exploit, every bypass—had one thing in common. They were all responsibly disclosed, because pentesting isn’t just about breaking things; it’s about fixing them before attackers strike.
If you found this episode valuable, please share it with someone who would appreciate it. The more we share this knowledge, the stronger we all become.
Let’s make cybersecurity knowledge accessible to all. See you in the next episode."
